1-2 13B2

CREDIT FOR ACCIDENT PRESSURE IN CALCULATED NPSH FOR ECCS AND CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS

Richard Lobel Marty Stutzke

June 29, 2004

B/32

Definition of Available NPSH

NPSH AVAILABLE = $h_{ATM} + h_{STATIC} - h_{LOSSES} - h_{VAPOR}$

where

 h_{ATM} = pressure of containment atmosphere

 h_{STATIC} = pressure due to height of water above pump suction

 h_{LOSSES} = pressure losses in piping, fittings, and screens

 h_{VAPOR} = vapor pressure of pumped fluid

NRC Guidance On NPSH

1970 Regulatory Guide 1.1 Guidance on NPSH

....adequate NPSH is provided to system pumps assuming maximum expected temperatures of pumped fluids and <u>no increase in containment</u> pressure from that present prior to postulated LOCAs.

Some reactors licensed with overpressure credit

1974 Regulatory Guide 1.82 Guidance on PWR Sump Design

1981 SRP 6.2.2 Rev 4 Containment Heat Removal Systems


for BWRs: $h_{atm} = 0$ for PWRs: $h_{atm} = h_{VAPOR}$, or,

 $h_{atm} = 0$

"NPSH analysis will be acceptable if it is done in accordance with ...Regulatory Guide 1.1, i.e., is based on maximum expected temperature of the pumped fluid and with atmospheric pressure in containment."

SRP 6.2.2 allows overpressure credit for subatmospheric containments during the first hour following a LOCA.

5



1985 GL 85-22 (GSI A-43) LOCA Debris Guidance h_{loss} increases

No backfit; consider for modifications Regulatory Guide 1.82 Rev 1 Issued. Fibrous insulation debris should be considered as uniformly distributed over the available debris screen area

Did not address containment conditions assumed in determining NPSH, only design of sumps and ECCS suction strainers

1996 BULLETIN 96-03 BWR ECCS STRAINER BLOCKAGE h_{loss} increases

Result of the 1992 Barsebäck event (strainer blockage).
BWRs should Install suction strainers. Results in greater pressure losses
Increased suction losses due to larger strainers and consideration of debris

1997 GL 97-04 Request for information on NPSH calculations for containment heat removal and ECCS pumps including credit for containment overpressure. BWRs and PWRs.

Prompted by credit for overpressure w/o prior NRC review and approval.
Reviews of all operating reactors performed.
Criteria developed for the review allowed credit for containment overpressure. These criteria were not documented at this time.

All BWR NPSH calculations revised as a result of Bulletin 96-03. Some BWRs received credit for overpressure. Some BWRs licensed with credit for overpressure and the credit for overpressure was increased. Some BWRs did not need overpressure in order to comply with Bulletin 96-03.

2003 Bulletin 2001-03 Guidance on PWR Sump Blockage

Some PWR licensees may request credit for containment overpressure to compensate for higher head losses

RG 1.82 Rev 3 Guidance

ECCS and containment heat removal systems should be designed so that sufficient available NPSH is provided to system pumps assuming maximum expected temperature and no increase in containment pressure from that present prior to LOCA

For certain operating reactors for which the design cannot be practicably altered, conformance with the previous position may not be possible. In these cases, no additional containment pressure should be included in NPSH analyses than necessary to preclude pump cavitation.

For certain operating reactors for which the design cannot be practicably altered, credit may be taken for pump tests which demonstrate that a cavitating pump will continue to deliver the design basis flow rate. The time period is no longer than that of the test.

Risk Consideration

A risk calculation is performed using realistic input values and assumptions.

Vermont Yankee personnel indicate that when using realistic input and assumptions, no credit for containment overpressure is required.

Therefore, the licensee states that the risk increase is negligible.

Risk Consideration (Cont)

A staff calculation using the VY IPE and SPAR model calculated the change in CDF given that containment pressure is required

This was determined as

(Large LOCA frequency)(Probability of failure of containment isolation)

It was assumed that loss of overpressure is equivalent to loss of ECCS pumps and therefore core damage.

 Δ CDF = 1.3E-07 = Δ LERF

THIS IS SMALL AND ACCEPTABLE ACCORDING TO RG 1.174

Postulated Accidents for which Overpressure Credit Has Been Allowed

LARGE BREAK LOCA ATWS STATION BLACKOUT APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRE

Reactors Which Have Received Overpressure Credit

Beaver Valley Unit 1 (PWR)

Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3 (BWR Mark I Containment)

Cooper (BWR Mark I Containment)

Dresden Units 2 and 3 (BWR Mark I Containment)

Duane Arnold (BWR Mark I Containment)

FitzPatrick (BWR Mark I Containment)

Fort Calhoun (PWR)

Hatch Units 1 and 2 (BWR Mark I Containment)

Monticello (BWR Mark I Containment)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 (PWRs)

Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 (PWRs)

Oyster Creek (BWR Mark I Containment)

Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 (BWR Mark I Containment)

Pilgrim (BWR Mark I Containment)

Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 (BWR Mark I Containment)

Surry Units 1 and 2 (PWRs)

Proposed Modified Position

Credit for overpressure is allowed when a conservative calculation demonstrates that sufficient containment pressure is available

No test of "necessity" or specific cause of the NPSH deficiency is part of the criteria for allowing credit for containment overpressure.

No limit is placed on the amount of pressure that may be assumed available as long as the pressure is determined conservatively.

Risk considerations to be determined as part of Vermont Yankee review.

Plan For Re-evaluating Credit For Containment Accident Pressure

- 1. Withdraw RG 1.1
- 2. Modify RG 1.82 Rev 3 to reflect the modified position
- 3. Modify SRP 6.2.2 to reflect modified position